In Jerusalem, the argument was that intelligence was too centralized in the run-up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, with skeptics drowned out by an almighty, overbearing Directorate of Military Intelligence.įollowing that war, the Agranat Commission of Inquiry found fault in the alleged total reliance on the DMI and recommended a fundamental reform. In Washington, the separate intelligence entities of the Departments of State, War, Navy, and the FBI (whose beat was the Western hemisphere) were shown to need integration hence the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. Yom Kippur is etched in memory as Israel’s Pearl Harbor, but the lessons learned by American leaders, first in Congress and then in the Executive Branch (with Truman, the senator-turned-president playing successive roles in both), were turned upside down by the Israeli system of having two or three ministers in charge of various agencies. > Inside Intelligence: Read more from Amir Oren It provides context for what would take place 15 years later-the role of assessment error (“low probability”) in the failure to brace properly for the Yom Kippur War. Thanks to declassified top-secret minutes of Israel’s cabinet sessions, Ben-Gurion’s approach to the intelligence operations policy nexus is now publicly available. The danger of a ring of hostility was abated. That long-forgotten episode is an interesting case study in crisis management-although King Hussein ultimately survived yet another plot (and went on to rule for 40 additional years), and Qasim turned out to be an Iraqi nationalist, who put Iraq’s national aspirations ahead of Cairo’s and Moscow’s. Yom Kippur is etched in memory as Israel’s Pearl Harbor, but the lessons learned by American leaders, first in Congress and then in the Executive Branch, were turned upside down by the Israeli system.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |